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BECAUSE I AM BLACK, BECAUSE I AM
WOMAN: REMEDYING THE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT EXPERIENCE
OF BLACK WOMEN
ANDREA L. DENNIS
PROLOGUE
LESLIE'S PLIGHT
Rap-rap. Rap-rap. There is a light knock on your new office door, the
nameplate of which reads "Erika Childress, Esq."
"Here goes, "you think, "the first potential client of my own law finn! I
hope it's an interesting case. I hope she can pay."
"Come in, "you respond. A young, Black woman in her mid-twenties
pokes her head in the door.
"Yes, come in. May I help you?"
"I'm not sure," she responds, still standing in the doorway.
"Please, sit down. Tell me why you're here."
"I've been having trouble at work. I mean, someone at work has been
bothering me. It's this White guy, a co-worker." She pauses. "I'm not sure,
maybe I shouldn't be here. Maybe I'm overreacting."
"No, you're here. Since you made the trip, go ahead. Maybe you are
right, and there is nothing to worry about. But you won't know unless you
tell me."
"Well, " she begins slowly, "this guy has been touching me. It makes me
uncomfortable. And, he, he's made some comments. Like last week, he came
up behind me at my desk and whispered in my ear that he wanted to have
sex with me. I just brushed him off and lie walked away laughing. And
yesterday he asked if I had a boyfriend. When I said, 'Yes,' he asked if he
was Black. I told him it was none of his business. He swore at me and said,
'Of course it's my business, nigger.' And finally, I found this note on my
chair. I'm not sure, but I think he put it there." She hands the note across
the desk.
The author wishes to thank Professor Paulette Caldwell for pro-
viding a supporting environment in which to explore the issues raised in
this Note.
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The note reads: "I really like Black women. I want to make love to you,
you Black bitch."
Sitting back in the chair, you pause for a moment to think. "Ok. Well,
I think you were right to come see me. Have you talked to anyone at work
about this?"
"No, I didn't think it would help. You see, my boss in my previous
department at work made several passes at me. One day in particular, he
called me into his office and said to be ready to go away on travel. I was
surprised. Although he was my superior, we didn't work together much. As
I was leaving, he said with a straight face, 'Why don't I book us a room
together? I mean, after all, we're the only Black people in the department.
Everyone thinks we're sleeping together already anyways.' I couldn't say
anything. I just left and went straight to see Ms. Washington-the Human
Resources Representative. She told me I was overreacting. She said, 'Sister,
you know how Black men are, and you know that it's hard to find a good
woman in the corporate world. He's just interested in you. You should be
flattered. '"
"Oh, I see," you reply. "Ok .... Let's start again from the
beginning."
Though fictional, Leslie's story exemplifies several ways in
which Black' women may experience sexual harassment. Leslie ex-
perienced a form of sexual harassment known as "hostile environ-
ment"2 from both colleagues. Moreover, in both instances, the
harassment was infused with racial overtones. The harassers
targeted Leslie not only because of her gender but also because of
her race. This combination of sexually focused and racially focused
1. Throughout this work, the terms Black and White are used. Although sty-
listic manuals recommend the use of a lower-case "b," see, e.g., T-E CHICAGO MAN.
UAL OF STYLE 7.32-7.33 (13th ed. 1982), the choice to use a capital "B" is the
author's personal one based on the need for self-definition. The letter "W" in
White is capitalized to maintain consistency. Compare Wendy Brown-Scott, Race
Consciousness in Higher Education: Does "Sound Educational Policy" Support the Contin-
ued Existence of Historically Black Colleges?, 43 EMORy LJ. 1, 4 n.4 (1994) (preferring
"Black") with Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REv. 581, 586 n.20 (1990) (preferring "black").
2. Sexual harassment law recognizes claims of quid pro quo sexual harass-
ment and "hostile environment" sexual harassment. BAIWAMR LINDEMANN & DAVID
KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAv 7 (1992). Quid pro quo sexual
harassment involves the "proposed exchange ofjob benefits for sexual favors." Id.
Hostile environment sexual harassment involves offensive conduct which is moti-
vated by the victim's sex. Id. at 8. The "hostile environment may or may not be
expressed in sexual gestures, language, or activity." Id. Unless otherwise specified,
throughout this Note, the term "sexual harassment" refers to hostile environment
sexual harassment.
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behavior will create problems for Leslie should she seek legal re-
dress under the current sexual harassment law framework 3
Leslie's inability to find an adequate legal remedy began when
American society constructed two broad categories for its major so-
cial ills: race problems and women's issues:4 hence, racism and sex-
ism. When society discusses these matters, the two issues are
considered distinct and separate; only rarely does society acknowl-
edge that racism and sexism may, and frequently do, intersect and
interact.5 Black women, however, have always recognized the inter-
section of race and gender. In the earliest days, Sojourner Truth
declared "ar'n't I a woman?:"
Dat man ober dar say dat woman needs to be lifted ober
ditches, and to have de best place every whar. Nobody eber
helped me into carriages, or ober mud puddles, or gives me
any best place and ar'n't I a woman? Look at me! Look at my
arm! I have plowed, and planted, and gathered into barns,
and no man could head me-and ar'n't I a woman? I could
work as much and eat as much as a man (when I could get it),
and bear de lash as well-and ar'n't I a woman? I have borne
thirteen chilern and seen mos' all sold off into slavery, and
when I cried out with a mother's grief, none butJesus heard-
and ar'n't I a woman?6
Though scholars in other disciplines were quick to study and
incorporate into their work the concept of "intersectionality,"7 only
3. See discussion infra Part H. Because of the racial element of the sexual
harassment, a Black woman could also possibly bring a claim under a thcory of
racial harassment. See infra note 14 for the elements of a racial harassment claim.
This Note does not address whether and under what circumstances a racial harass-
ment claim would be deficient, or provide a solution to the problems highlighted
within this Note. Arguably, however, because the standards for sexual harassment
and racial harassment are similar, compare infra note 14 with text accompanying
notes 80-82, similar problems would result if a Black woman sought to make a
racial harassment claim.
4. See Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place;
Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARv. C.R1-C.L. L. REv. 9, 10 (1989).
5. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Gender, and Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CA- L
REv. 1467, 1467-68 (1992).
6. Sojourner Truth's famous speech made in 1851 at the Akron, Ohio, Wo-
men's Rights convention, at which she was treated with boos and hisses, is quoted
in DEBORAH GRAY WHITE, AR'N'T I A WoMiAN?: FF-1ALE SLA.,S IN THE PLANTATION
SOUTH 14 (1985).
7. See, e.g., BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOAN: BLAcWomiEN AND FE-miNSM (1981);
PAULA GmDINcs, WHEN AND WiiERE I ENTER: THE IWPACT OF BLAcK Wo.ENi oN
RAcE AND SFx rN AmmcA (1984); WVHITE, supra note 6. By "intersectionality," the
author refers to the intersection of race and gender issues.
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recently has the legal academy begun to reflect on the role of inter-
sectionality in the law.8 Collectively, legal scholars argue that
["w]henever the legal system has attempted to deal with problems
Black women face in the workplace, it has consistently ignored their
social history and failed to truly understand their experiences or
address their concerns."9
This Note examines the intersection of race and gender in the
context of sexual harassment jurisprudence. 10 Since the arrival in
this country of the first female African slaves, Black women have
experienced sexual harassment on the job." This Note discusses
the failure of sexual harassment theory to acknowledge the unique
sexual harassment experience of Black women. From the very earli-
est discussions of sexual harassment, the impact of the race of the
victim on the experience and resulting legal claim was ignored.
Feminist legal theorists, leaders in issues affecting women, have
been slow to acknowledge and integrate the role of race into their
analyses.' 2
8. See, e.g., Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 539 (1989);
Paulette Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991
DuKE LJ. 365 (1991); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race
and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theoy and
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHL LEGAL F. 139 (1989); Harris, supra note 1. This list is
by no means exhaustive, but merely a representative sampling. See Richard Del-
gado &Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography 1993, A Year of
Transition, 66 U. CoLo. L. REV. 159 (1995); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic,
Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461 (1993) for a listing
of articles that discuss intersectionality.
9. Cathy Scarborough, Note, Conceptualizing Black Women's Employment Exper-
iences, 98 YAE LJ. 1457, 1457 (1989).
10. The conclusions drawn in this Note apply with equal force to all women of
color. The analysis of the sexual harassment experience of Black women would
have to be modified to reflect the different experiences of other women of color in
"White America," yet, the conclusion would still follow that the current sexual har-
assment framework would not fit their needs because the creation of the frame-
work failed to take into account the role of race. See discussion infra Part 11. See
Maria L. Ontiveros, Three Perspectives on Workplace Harassment of Women of Color,
C989 ALI-ABA 259 for a discussion of the sexual harassment experiences of other
women of color who have experienced harassment based upon the interaction of
gender and race. See Martha Chamallas, Jean Jew's Case: Resisting Sexual Harassment
in the Academy, 6 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 71 (1994) for an article discussing the case of
Jean Jew, a Chinese-American woman who was harassed in a university academic
setting. See alsoJew v. University of Iowa, 749 F. Supp. 946 (S.D. Iowa 1990). Addi-
tionally, though White women are the normative standard in sexual harassment
cases, they could also benefit from inclusion of race in some instances, for they too
may experience sexual harassment infused with racial overtones.
11. See infra Part I.
12. See Crenshaw, supra note 8.
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This Note explores how intersectionality is ignored in the judi-
cial response to sexual harassment by explaining how Title VII
presents an incomplete approach to the problem. Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,13 prohibits sexual harassment as a form of
gender discrimination and treats racial harassment as a form of pro-
hibited race discrimination. 14 Title VII does not, however, recog-
nize that sexual harassment may in some instances be motivated by
and infused with race to create an experience of "interactive
harassment."
This Note argues that the existing framework for analysis of
sexual harassment claims is inadequate to protect the interests of
Black women who experience interactive harassment. As aptly
pointed out by Cathy Scarborough, "[t]he very laws designed to
eliminate employment discrimination have actually placed new ob-
stacles in front of Black women. In order to challenge employment
discrimination, Black women must use legal remedies and strategies
that were designed for others."15 In order to correct this problem,
legal scholars argue that sexual harassment law must be changed.' 6
This Note posits that either the current rules governing the proof
of sexual harassment must be modified to fit the needs of Black
women, or a new cause of action, entitled "interactive workplace
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1995). Title VII makes it "an unlawful employment
practice for an employer... to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id. at 1. The Supreme
Court first ruled upon the issue of sexual harassment in Meittor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). In Meritor, the court held that hostile enironment
sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII as a form of gender discrimination.
See id. at 73.
14. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), was the first case to recog-
nize a claim of racially hostile work environment. The Sixth Circuit, in Davis v.
Monsanto Chemical Co., 858 F.2d 345 (6th Cir. 1988), laid out the routinely accepted
standard for proving a claim of racially hostile work environment.
In order to satisfy the first requirement, 'repeated slurs,' the plaintiff must
show that the alleged racial harassment constituted an unreasonably abusive
or offensive work-related environment or adversely affected the reasonable
employee's ability to perform the tasks required by the employer .... [Tihe
plaintiff need not prove that his or her tangible productivity has declined as a
result of the harassment. The employee need only show that the harassment
made it more difficult to do the job.
Id. at 349. The plaintiff must also show that the employer "tolerated or condoned
the situation." Id, This requires the plaintiff to "establish that the employer knew
or should have known of the alleged conduct and failed to take prompt remedial
action." I&
15. Scarborough, supra note 9, at 1457.
16. See Ontiveros, supra note 10, at 272.
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harassment" designed to protect Black women from sexual harass-
ment as a discrete class under Tite VII, must be formulated.
Part I of this Note provides a description of the unique sexual
harassment experience of Black women. Statistics, historical evi-
dence, anecdotes, and cases are used to provide a practical context
and demonstrate the need for a new theory of sexual harassment.
Part II critiques the primary academic scholarship on sexual harass-
ment law, Catharine MacKinnon's 1979 book, Sexual Harassment of
Working Women. 17 MacKinnon's work was chosen because it "has
been instrumental in persuading the legal establishment to view
sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination. Moreover, she
helped to persuade public policymakers that the Civil Rights Act
should be used to remedy... 'hostile environment' sexual harass-
ment."18 This section argues, however, that in her formulation of a
cause of action for sexual harassment, MacKinnon ignores the ex-
periences of Black women.
Part III posits that under the current sexual harassment legal
framework, given a certain set of facts, a Black woman may fail to
meet her evidentiary burden to prevail on a claim of sexual harass-
ment because she cannot prove the requisite severity level of harass-
ment. Part IV presents the ways in which race, where appropriate,
may be incorporated into the analysis of sexual harassment claims.
Part IV.A. suggests the aggregation of evidence in determining the
severity of the harassment in sexual harassment cases. Part IVB.
proposes the option of recognizing Black women as a discrete class
under Title VII in cases of sexual harassment. Within subsection A
and subsection B, this Note undertakes a critique of the proposed
solution.
This Note closes by applying the methodologies put forth in
Part IV to Leslie's plight. This application seeks to apply the theory
discussed within this Note to a practical context and to demonstrate
how a more inclusive approach to harassment provides a solution
that is equitable and gives full relief.
17. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979). MacKinnon's work is detailed and intensive.
Although worthy of a more in-depth critique, only a brief one is presented here.
18. EDMUND WALL, SEXUAL HARASSMENT: CONFRONTATIONS AND DECISIONS 15
(1992).
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I
THE BASICS: DEFINING THE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT EXPERIENCE OF
BLACK WOMEN
The differential experiences of Black women and White wo-
men arise from the unique historical experience of Black women in
the United States.19 "A historical experience of sexual exploitation
and oppression, [and] myths that support perceptions of [the] pro-
miscuity of [B]lack women" contribute to the experiences of Black
women.20 The extensive sexual exploitation and rape of Black fe-
male slaves is the most extreme example of workplace sexual harass-
ment. Yet even when sexual abuse of female slaves did not rise to
the level of rape, the harassment was overt. For example, in one of
the few biographical slave narratives written by a woman, Harriet
Jacobs (writing under the alias Linda Brent) speaks of the sexual
advances of her White owner which began when she turned fifteen:
My master began to whisper foul words in my ear. Young as I
was, I could not remain ignorant of their import. I tried to
treat them with indifference or contempt .... He tried his
utmost to corrupt the pure principles my grandmother had in-
stilled. He peopled my young mind with unclean images .... .-2
The notion that Black women were sexually available did not
cease with the end of slavery. After slavery, Black women continued
to work for White men as sharecroppers, tenant farmers,
farmworkers, and domestic servants. In these occupations Black
women suffered the same level of sexual harassment, though no
longer technically legal, as existed during slavery.22 Additionally,
White employers continued to use stereotypes that originated dur-
ing slavery to justify the sexual treatment of Black women.
The three most pervasive stereotypes of Black women were
those of the "Mammy," the "Jezebel," and the "Sapphire."2 The
Mammy stereotype was that of an overweight, matronly, do-gooder
woman who was asexual.2 4 TheJezebel was the promiscuous female
19. SeeJann H. Adams, Sexual Harassment and Black Women: A Historical Perspec-
tive, in SExuAL. HARASmrr: THEORY, RESFARci, TR.ATENr 213, 214 (William
O'Donohue ed., 1997).
20. Id. at 222.
21. HARRmT JAcOBS, INCmENTS IN THE LiE OF A SLAVE GiRL 27 (lean Yelin
ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1987) (1861).
22. See Adams, supra note 19, at 218.
23. Id.
24. See id. For an extended discussion of the Mammy stereot)pe see WHrrF,
supra note 6, at 46-61.
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with an insatiable sexual appetite.2 5 The Sapphire referred to the
manipulative troublemaker who had no loyalties.2 6
While the Jezebel stereotype most obviously supported the sex-
ual exploitation of Black women, the other two stereotypes also
contributed to this subjugation. The harassment claims of a
"Mammy" would fall on deaf ears because no one believed that a
man would lust after an asexual woman.27 Similarly, a "Sapphire's"
claims of sexual abuse would be eclipsed by her reputation for de-
ception, lying and lack of loyalty. These stereotypes, which were
borne in the slavery experience of Black women, continued to exist
after slavery ended and still contribute to the unique harassment
experience of Black women today.
Statistics published by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") indicate that 14.4% of the women who file
sexual harassment claims are Black.28 61.9% of the remaining
claims are filed by White women and 14.7% by women of other
races. 29 These statistics, however, merely indicate the rate at which
women-including Black women-report their claims to legal offi-
cials, and do not necessarily indicate the actual rate at which Black
women experience sexual harassment. A survey of women faculty
members at American colleges and universities illuminates this
point. Researchers at the University of Michigan conducted a study
entitled "Betrayed by the Academy: The Sexual Harassment of Wo-
men College Faculty"30 that revealed that 13% of Black female
faculty surveyed felt they had been sexually harassed.3' Whether
these statistics are representative of the experiences of women
outside the academic setting is unclear.
The sexual exploitation of Black women has obviously declined
since slavery. Yet, the widespread perception of Black women as
25. See Adams, supra note 19, at 218. For an extended discussion of the Jeze-
bel stereotype see WHITE, supra note 6, at 28-46.
26. See Adams, supra note 19, at 218.
27. The modem-day version of this logic is that women who are "plain" or
ugly cannot be sexually abused because no one would find them attractive.
28. CENTER FOR WOMEN IN GOVERNMENT, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORT-
NITY COMMISSION (1994).
29. Id.
30. Melita M. Garza, Study Finds Faculty Harassment Unwanted Sexual Advances
Reported by 1 in 7 Women, CHI. TRIB. Apr. 8, 1994, at 4 available in 1994 WL 6532575
(citing Eric Dey et al., BETRAYED BY THE ACADEMY- THE SEXUAL HARASSMEN" OF
WOMEN COLLEGE FACULTY).
31. See id. By comparison, 15% of White women and 6% of Asian American
faculty reported harassment. Id. About 20% of Native American and Hispanic
women faculty reported harassment. Id.
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sexually available remains.3 2 The EEOC study also reports that
claims filed with the EEOC by Black women were less likely to be
found meritorious and more likely to close with a finding of "no
reasonable cause" than claims filed by White women.33
While the statistical evidence does not describe what effect race
has on the likelihood of being sexually harassed,34 anecdotal and
historical evidence indicates that the dynamics of sexual harass-
ment for Black women may be different from that of White wo-
men.35 Black women themselves are often not certain whether they
have experienced sexual harassment or racial harassment;3 6 how-
ever, many Black women who complain of harassment suspect that
they are being harassed because of both their race and gender.
"This is manifested either implicitly, so that the woman is unsure
whether the harassment is racially or sexually motivated, or explic-
itly where the harasser expressed his sexual interest in terms of her
race."3 7 The experience of Black women and White women is simi-
lar in that both are referred to and treated like "cunts," "beavers,"
or "piece;" yet, as several cases illustrate, for Black women those
insults are sometimes prefaced with "Black," or "nigger," or
"jungle."3 8
For example, in Brooms v. Regal Tube Co.,39 the harasser showed
his victim "a pornographic photograph depicting an interracial act
of sodomy and told her that the photograph showed the 'talent' of
a [B]lack woman," and in a later incident, the defendant showed
the victim a "racist pornographic picture involving bestiality" and
told her that she was going to end up like that.40 Likewise, in Conti-
32. See infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of Brooms and
Continental Can.
33. See supra note 28.
34. See Adams, supra note 19, at 214.
35. See id. at 220.
36. SeeJudy Trent Ellis, Sexual Harassment and Race A Legal Analysis of Discrimi-
nation, 1981 J. OF LEGis. 30, 42 (1981).
37. Id,
38. Kimberle Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It Anyay? Feininist and Antiradst Appro-
priations of Anita Hill, in RAc - cs JusricE, EN-END ENG PoumR 402, 412 (Toni
Morrison ed., 1992).
39. 881 F.2d 412, 417 (7th Cir. 1989).
40. In Brooms, the plaintiff was repeatedly subject to comments and conduct
of both a racial and sexual nature. "Most of the incidents involved [the defend-
ant's] use of racial slurs or a combination of racial slurs and sexual innuendo." Id.
at n.1. Plaintiff filed suit charging sexual harassment or racial harassment. Se id.
at 416. The jury denied the plaintiff's claim of racial harassment. Ser id. The
bench awardedjudgment in favor of the plaintiff on the sexual harassment claim.
See id.
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nental Can Co. v. Minnesota,41 the harasser told the plaintiff that "he
wished slavery days would return so that he could sexually train her
and she would be his bitch."42
These cases demonstrate that for Black women, sexual harass-
ment often involves racial overtones. Legal scholarship which fo-
cuses on developing appropriate remedies for sexual harassment,
however, does not adequately account for these racialized percep-
tions of gender.
II
FAILURE TO INCORPORATE RACE INTO THE
FORMULATION OF A CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT
In her work Sexual Harassment of Working Women, 43 Catharine
MacKinnon forcefully argues that sexual harassment constitutes a
remediable form of gender discrimination. 44 MacKinnon pub-
lished her book at a time when only a few lower courts had ruled on
the viability of sexual harassment claims.45 The Supreme Court had
not yet addressed the matter.46 MacKinnon synthesized the then-
existing case law brought by women challenging unwanted sexual
advances in the workplace into a coherent theory of sexual harass-
ment as a remediable form of gender discrimination. 47 Her posi-
tion was more or less adopted in Vinson v. Taylot4 in which Chief
Judge Spottswood Robinson found that a plaintiff could maintain a
claim for either quid pro quo or hostile environment sexual harass-
41. 297 N.W.2d 241, 246 (Minn. 1980).
42. Id. Plaintiff solely claimed sexual harassment. Plaintiff was both touched
and insulted in a sexual manner. See id. at 243. Although there was racial discrinii-
nation in the work environment, see id. at 245, the facts alleged only the one in-
stance of the use of racial slurs.
43. MACKINNON, supra note 17.
44. See id. at 208-13.
45. The book was published in 1979, after the following cases had been
brought: Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Williams v.
Saxbe, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir.
1977); Munford v. James T. Barnes Co., 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Tom-
kins v. Public Service Electricity & Gas, 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976); Come v.
Bausch & Lomb, 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975). This list is not inclusive of all
the lower court cases which had been brought at that time.
46. Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 57, was not heard until 1986. See supra
note 13.
47. See MAcKiNNON, supra note 17, at 101-26.
48. 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Vinson was subsequently appealed and af-
firmed by the Supreme Court in Meritor v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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ment 49 Quid pro quo sexual harassment involves the "proposed
exchange of job benefits for sexual favors."50 Hostile environment
sexual harassment involves offensive conduct which is motivated by
the victim's sex.5' The "hostile environment may or may not be
expressed in sexual gestures, language, or activity."5 2
This section argues that MacKinnon's work, important to the
development of sexual harassment law,53 is nonetheless problem-
atic for Black women who experience sexual harassment with racial-
ized overtones 54 Understanding the flaws in MacKinnon's work is
important because similar problems arise when sexual harassment
is addressed in litigation.
MacKinnon takes a four-step approach to reaching her ulti-
mate conclusion that sexual harassment constitutes a form of gen-
der discrimination. First, she uses empirical evidence to
demonstrate that the structure of the employment system makes
women vulnerable to sexual harassment because the system places
women in traditional and inferiorjobs 55 Second, she provides per-
sonal accounts of the experiences of women who have been sexu-
ally harassed.56 Third, she analyzes the few cases which, at the time,
raised the issue of sexual harassment.5 7 Finally, she confronts and
answers the ultimate question: does sexual harassment constitute
gender discrimination?58
The second step of MacKinnon's argument is the part of her
work that is problematic for Black women. MacKinnon believes
that "[w] omen's lived-through experience, in as whole and truthful
a fashion as can be approximated... should begin to provide the
starting point and context out of which is constructed the narrower
forms of abuse that will be made illegal on their behalf."59 In other
words, MacKinnon believes that creating a legal cause of action for
sexual harassment necessarily requires examining the experiential
dimensions of the problem which is sought to be rectified through
49. Vinson, 753 F.2d at 144-46.
50. LnDniANN & KAD E, supra note 2, at 7.
51. Seeid. at8.
52. Id
53. See WNALL, supra note 18, at 17 arguing that in Vinson, ChiefJudge Robin-
son adopted MacKinnon's rationale.
54. Hereinafter termed "interactive harassment."
55. See MACKqIoN, supra note 17, at 4.
56. See U
57. See iU
58. See i&
59. Id. at 26.
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the law.60 Her beliefs are supported by psychological theory on sex-
ual harassment:
Definitions of concepts and terms such as "hostile environ-
ment," "unwelcome advances," or "sexual intentions," which
are common in definitions of sexual harassment, are heavily
dependent on people's perceptions, labeling, attributions,
judgments, and interpretations of incidents .... Investigating
and understanding these conceptions and processes of sexual
harassment are highly important because... they are directly
related to legal definitions, considerations, and rulings.61
The task of framing the experience must be undertaken with
care to present the story in a factually correct manner and in a way
which takes into account women's wide range of experiences. If
such care is not taken, the resulting cause of action will not meet
the needs of women who are subject to sexual harassment. This
shortcoming is exactly the problem with MacKinnon's work.
MacKinnon's analysis is incomplete because the accounts upon
which she bases her formulation of a sexual harassment cause of
action do not adequately discuss the possibility of racial overtones
to sexual harassment. Thus, her cause of action does not suffi-
ciently protect Black women.
MacKinnon has previously been criticized for failing to incor-
porate race into her analysis. In Race &Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, Professor Angela Harris criticizes MacKinnon's "dominance
theory"62 for engaging in, what Professor Harris terms, "gender es-
sentialism."63 Gender essentialism is defined as the notion that the
experience of women can be "described independently of race,
class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience."64 Gen-
der essentialism silences the voices of Black women such that the
"woman's" experience is defined to encompass mostly "[W]hite,
straight, and socioeconomically privileged" people. 65 This one-di-
60. See id. at 31.
61. Azy Barak, Cross-cultural Perspectives on Sexual Harassment, in SEXUAL HAt-
AssMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND TREATMENT 263, 278-79 (William O'Donohue ed.
1997).
62. Briefly, "dominance theory" argues that "the idea of gender difference
helps keep the reality of male dominance in place' and that "the social relation
between the sexes is organized so that men may dominate and women must submit
and this relation is sexual-in fact, is sex." Catharine A. MacKinnon, Introduction:
The Art of the Impossible, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 3 (1987).
63. Harris, supra note 1. Professor Harris' work is the leading work on gender
essentialism.
64. Id. at 585.
65. Id. at 588.
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mensional characterization thus excludes from the gender dis-
course the voices of many women with affiliations other than
gender.
MacKinnon also relies upon gender essentialism in Sexual Har-
assment of Working Women. 66 This reliance is demonstrated by MacK-
innon's belief that the fact that "sexual harassment does occur to a
large and diverse population of women supports an analysis that it
occurs because of their group characteristic, that is, sex."67 Although
MacKinnon notes that each woman's experience is different be-
cause of certain variables such as age, marital status, class, and
race,68 she goes no further to examine this notion in detail. Thus,
she loses the chance to anti-essentialize her theory and locate it in a
context which includes the experiences of all women. MacKinnon
gives only cursory acknowledgment to racial factors by mentioning
that sexual harassment of Black women by White men may "reflect
a sense of impunity that resounds of slavery and colonization,"69
and asking whether White women feel more sexually degraded by a
Black male harasser.70 MacKinnon's discussion of the impact of
race on sexual harassment, unfortunately, goes no further.
MacKinnon does try to soften her failure to explore the effect
of variables on the sexual harassment experience by stating that
"[firequency and type of incident may vary with specific vulnerabil-
ity of the woman, or qualities of the job, employer, situation, or
workplace, to an extent so far undetermined."7 ' MacKinnon, how-
ever, claims that she cannot delve into the argument further be-
cause of the lack of information available at that time regarding
sexual harassment.72
MacKinnon's claim is troubling in three respects. First, if the
individual experiences of sexually harassed women are critical to
creating a sexual harassment cause of action, as MacKinnon so
clearly believes, then MacKinnon should have made every effort to
have a broader victim's story be an integral part of her cause of
66. See MACKINNON, supra note 17.
67. Id. at 27.
68. Id. at 28.
69. Id. at 30. MacKinnon discusses the case of Munford v. Barnes, 441 F. Supp.
459 (E.D.Mich. 1977), in which a Black woman was harassed by a White colleague.
MacKinnon states: "Apparently, sexmal harassment can be both a sexist vay to ex-
press racism and a racist way to express sexism .... Although racism is deeply
involved in sexual harassment, the element common to these incidents is that the
perpetrators are male, the victims female." MAcKINNoN, supra note 17, at 80.31.
70. See MACKINNON, supra note 17, at 30-31.
71. Id. at 28.
72. See id.
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action. By failing to do this, she ultimately creates a cause of action
which only provides a remedy for women who fit her model, that is,
White women.
Second, MacKinnon's unwillingness to address issues of race
implies that the matter is better left to a separate discourse-a re-
sult of gender essentialism Professor Harris calls "bracketing. 17 3
Bracketing forces Black women to choose gender over race, thereby
distorting their experiences.74 In order to utilize MacKinnon's
framework to redress her injury from harassment, a Black woman
must cast off her race and assume the perspective of a White wo-
man.75 If a Black woman chooses not to do so, she must look to
other discourses which focus exclusively on race. This separation
creates a presumption that one discourse cannot address both gen-
der and race.
Third, MacKinnon's failure to consider the greater implica-
tions of race lead her to conclude that race is simply "an intensifier:
If things are bad for everybody (meaning [W]hite women), then
they're even worse for [B]lack women."76 For example, when
MacKinnon addresses the question of what causes women to file
sexual harassment lawsuits, she points out that Black women
brought a disproportionate number of the first sexual harassment
lawsuits.77 She reasons that this is so because "Black women's least
advantaged position in the economy is consistent with their ad-
vanced position on the point of resistance .... [S]ince [B]lack
women stand to lose the most from sexual harassment, by compari-
son they may see themselves as having the least to lose by a struggle
against it."78 In other words, because the situation is so much worse
for Black women than White women, Black women are more likely
to pursue legal claims. The notion of intensifying is problematic, as
Professor Harris points out, because implicit in this concept is that
the experiences of women which differ from the White norm are
only variations on the White "woman's experience." 79 Thus, White
women are the norm and Black women are simply White women
who have it worse.
Though groundbreaking, Catharine MacKinnon's construc-
tion of a sexual harassment cause of action fails to adequately pro-
73. Harris, supra note 1, at 592-93.
74. See id. at 595.
75. See id. at 588-89.
76. Id. at 596.
77. See MAcKINNON, supra note 17, at 53.
78. Id.
79. Harris, supra note 1, at 593.
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tect the interests of Black female victims of sexual harassment.
MacKinnon's analysis of the problem omits the experiences of
Black women who suffer from sexual harassment infused with racial
epithets. The cause of action she creates does not leave room for
the discussion of race in sexual harassment claims; thus, sexual har-
assment claims are viewed from the normative perspective of a
White female victim.
m
HOW RACE FUNCTIONS IN THE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LEGAL CLAIMS OF
BLACK WOMEN
As discussed in Part II, Catharine MacKinnon does not ade-
quately consider race in her legal framework for sexual harassment
and thus she leaves Black women's experiences out of her formula-
tion of the sexual harassment cause of action. This section ad-
dresses the parallel omission of Black women's stories in the
judicial arena. This section argues that, because race is not a factor
in the analysis of a plaintiff's sexual harassment claim, Black female
plaintiffs may fail to meet the requisite showing of severity required
to prevail on such claims.
To sustain an actionable claim of hostile emironment sexual
harassment against an employer, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1)
that the employee belongs to a protected group; (2) that the sexual
or sex-based conduct was unwelcome to the employee, based upon
the employee's sex, and affected a term, condition, or privilege of
employment; and (3) that the employer directly engaged in the
conduct or was legally responsible for the actions of someone who
engaged in the conduct.80
With respect to the unwelcome conduct, in order to prevail on
a claim of sexual harassment, the plaintiff must demonstrate a suffi-
ciently severe level of harassing conduct to warrant protection.81
Because the current construction of sexual harassment law
presumes that sexual harassment occurs solely because of gender,
80. See Sarah Bums, Evidence of a Sexually Hostile Iortoplace: 17rat Is It and Hou
Should It Be Assessed After Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.?, 21 N.Y.U. RE, L & Soc.
CHANGE 357, 369 (1994). See also LlimhtA & KADUE, supra note 2, for an ex-
tended treatment of the issue of hostile environment sexual harassment.
81. See infra note 109 and accompanying text for a greater explanation of die
severity requirement.
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and is not influenced by the race of the victim, only gender-di-
rected behavior is considered in calculating the severity level.82
Thus, in the case of a Black woman who has experienced inter-
active harassment, the offending conduct must first be divided into
two categories: those actions based on race and those based on gen-
der. The gender-based offensive conduct is then analyzed to deter-
mine whether it contributes independently to the required level of
severity.8s The racial components are generally not considered in
the ultimate calculation of severity. The problem with this method
of analysis is that it requires a court to separate two wholly inter-
twined characteristics of Black women without any standard for do-
ing so and may prevent a Black woman from recovering simply
because she is both Black and female.8 4
If Black women themselves have trouble deciding what harm
they have experienced, 5 then courts, as outsiders, are ill-equipped
to engage in the task of dividing comments and behavior. For ex-
ample, how should the following case have been decided? In Jones
v. Chicago Research & Trading Group,86 plaintiff was subjected to con-
tinuous racial slurs, sexual slurs, and combinations of both. 7 Plain-
tiff alleged that "she was the victim of racial and sexual
harassment. '"88 After determining that under Title VII plaintiff
could maintain independent claims of racial harassment and sexual
harassment, the court proceeded to delineate certain comments as
racial and others as sexual.8 9 The court divided the conduct into
the following groupings: (1) those racial in nature: "she continu-
ously faced inappropriate comments and jokes about race, was
called a 'slave' by one of her supervisors, was ordered to 'fetch'
drinks for others in the work place, and was referred to as 'Wash-
ington' by another supervisor [a reference to the late, former Black
mayor of Chicago, Harold Washington]"; 90 and (2) those sexual in
82. Sexual harassment claims are analyzed under a but-for causation scheme.
"[A]ny harassment or other unequal treatment of an employee or group of em-
ployees that would not occur but for the sex of the employee or employees may, if
sufficiently patterned or pervasive, comprise an illegal condition of employment
under Title VII." McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
83. But see discussion of aggregation methodology infra Part W.A.
84. Assuming, of course, that she was able to prove all other elements of the
claim.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
86. No. 88 G 8532, 1991 WL 70889 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 1991).
87. See id. at *1.
88. Id. at *4.
89. See id. at *5-6.
90. Id. at *5.
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nature: "'women should be barefoot and pregnant,' and that she
and other women were treated like servants by the men in the de-
partment during the weekly card games."91 The court neglected to
classify such comments as it "was 'disgraceful' that [B]lack women
didn't shave their legs, and... jokes about the 'dress and walk' of
[B] lack women."92 Either the court failed to classify the insults due
to an oversight or purposefully declined to do so. Ultimately, de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment on the sexual harassment
claim was granted.93 Defendant's motion for summary judgment
on the racial harassment claim, though, was denied.94
The court could have divided the comments differently. For
example, the slave references could have been deemed to be refer-
ences to gender, or at least references to the interaction of race and
gender. Though slavery was premised on racial inferiority, and all
slaves were treated differently from Whites simply because of their
race, Black female slaves and Black male slaves were treated differ-
ently because of their differing genders.95 Additionally, the com-
ments regarding shaving and Black female dress and walk could be
interpreted as both gender and race based. Consider the following
logic: all women should shave their legs; White women shave their
legs; Black women do not shave their legs. This logic relies upon
the stereotypes that women are different from men and Black wo-
men are different from White women. Thus, combination of gen-
der and race may be viewed as the bases for the harassment.
Because no set of guidelines aids courts in dividing harassing
conduct, inappropriate division may occur and result in Black wo-
men receiving no protection. If the level of severity of the com-
ments categorized as sexual is not enough to support a claim of
sexual harassment, then a plaintiff may not recover for her harms.
Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co.96 demonstrates this phenomenon. In Hicks
, a Black woman alleged that she was subjected to sexual harass-
ment and racial harassment by White male co-workers. 97 "Gates'
employees testified that an atmosphere existed in which racial slurs
and jokes were tolerated."98 Supervisors referred to Blacks as "nig-
91. Id. at *6.
92. Id. at *2.
93. See id. at *6.
94. See d. at *5.
95. WHTE, supra note 6, at 62.
96. 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987) (hereinafter "Hids r).
97. See id.
98. Id. at 1409.
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gers" and "coons."99 Plaintiff herself was referred to as "Buffalo
Butt."100 Additionally, one harasser grabbed the plaintiff's "breasts
and [the plaintiff] fell over, and he got on top of [her].""-°
The trial court determined that plaintiff was subjected to
neither racial harassment nor quid pro quo sexual harassment.' 02
After a bench trial, the court concluded that "there was no evidence
to support plaintiff's claim that defendant maintained and permit-
ted a work environment openly hostile to [B] lack employees. The
only evidence suggestive of this was disputed."'0 3 With respect to
the quid pro quo sexual harassment claim, the court determined
that "the incident of patting [plaintiffs] thigh ... was an isolated
incident in which there was no sexual advance intended... [and]
that there was a 'dispute as to the degree of the violation."' ' 4
Thus, the judge found the harassing conduct either lacking in cred-
ibility or insignificant, leaving the plaintiff with no remedy.
On appeal, the circuit court upheld the trial court findings
with respect to racial harassment, stating that "[t] he evidence shows
incidents that were essentially occasional and incidental."' 05 The
court remanded the case for a new determination as to whether
plaintiff was sexually harassed, however, because the lower court
had failed to consider the recently recognized hostile environment
theory of sexual harassment. 10 6 The court also held that, on re-
mand, the evidence of racial treatment, in conjunction with the sex-
ual treatment, should be considered for the purpose of
determining whether there was a pervasive discriminatory
atmosphere.10 7
This case demonstrates how the race-gender dichotomy that
exists in MacKinnon's work on sexual harassment has been re-
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1410 (quotations omitted).
102. See id. at 1412.
103. Id. at 1411.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1413.
106. See id. at 1414. At the time of the trial court decision, the Supreme Court
had yet to decide Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 57. Meritar held that hostile
environment sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII. See Hicks 1, 833 F.2d
at 1414.
107. See Hicks 1, 833 F.2d at 1416-17. On remand, plaintiff failed on her claim
of sexual harassment, despite the aggregation of racial and sexual harassment evi-
dence. Subsequently, appeal was taken of the second trial. On appeal, the circuit
court upheld the findings on remand. See Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 928 F.2d 966,
972 (10th Cir. 1991) (hereinafter Hicks I). Hicks is discussed further in Part IV.A.
because of its use of the aggregation methodology.
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peated in the judicial context The narrow analysis MacKinnon
conducted, which deems injurious only one dimension of harassing
conduct, prevents Black women from meeting the requisite show-
ing of severity to recover under Title VII for sexual harassment.
When Black women experience interactive harassment, the treat-
ment based upon race and gender may be separated out because it
is not solely based on gender, and is thus deemed not violative of
sexual harassment law. This is an unfair result which can only be
remedied by factoring race into the analysis of sexual harassment
claims.
IV
IMPORTING RACE INTO THE ANALYSIS OF
SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS
The current sexual harassment legal framework does not ap-
propriately take race into account and, thereby, poses problems for
Black women who experience interactive harassment.108 In order
to protect Black women from interactive harassment, two readily
identifiable options exist. Courts may either permit plaintiffs to ag-
gregate evidence of racial harassment with evidence of sexual har-
assment in order to determine the severity level of the harassment,
or courts may create a new cause of action which protects Black
women as a discrete class in Tite VII cases of sexual harassment.
A. Aggregation Metlwdology
To prevail upon a claim of hostile environment sexual harass-
ment, the unwelcome conduct complained of must be sufficiently
pervasive or severe to alter the victim's employment and create an
abusive working environment °10 9 In the case of a Black woman who
experiences interactive harassment, the sexual comments would
normally be divided out and independently evaluated to determine
whether the work environment was sufficiently hostile to merit re-
108. See supra Part III.
109. See Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 67. The severity or pervasiveness of
conduct is a matter of perspective. Courts and the EEOC apply an objective stan-
dard. That is, they view the harassment from the perspective of the "reasonable
person." Although legal commentators have pressed for use of the reasonable wvo-
man standard, courts have rejected this standard. In Harris v. Foddif Systems, Inc.,
510 U.S. 17 (1993), the Supreme Court refused to adopt a subjective standard.
"The Court described its objective test as a generic reasonable person examination
and left the lower courts and the EEOC to fine-tune methods of factoring the
plaintiffs membership in a protected category into the inquiry." Burns, supra note
80, at 392.
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covery. °10 Such a practice may adversely affect the claims of Black
women plaintiffs. An alternative option exists, however. A court
could apply the "aggregation methodology," where racial incidents
of harassment are combined with sexually harassing behavior to de-
termine whether the work environment was sufficiently hostile.
Only one circuit court has adopted the aggregation methodol-
ogy." 1 In Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co.,1 12 the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit specifically addressed the question of "whether, in
determining the pervasiveness of the harassment against a plaintiff,
a trial court may aggregate evidence of racial hostility with evidence
of sexual hostility."113 In Hicks I, the plaintiff alleged both sexual
harassment and racial harassment.11 4 The trial court had previ-
ously determined that the incidents alleged to support plaintiff's
claim of racial harassment were insufficient to sustain a claim.I
Although the circuit court affirmed the insufficiency of the racial
harassment claim," 6 it explicitly authorized the use of aggrega-
tion.1 7 The court held that incidents of racial harassment, even
though insufficient to maintain a racial harassment claim when
judged alone, could be "combined with incidents of sexual harass-
ment to prove a pervasive pattern of discriminatory harassment in
violation of Title VII."11 8 The court then remanded the case and
directed the trial court to "determine whether there was a pervasive
discriminatory atmosphere, combining the racial and sexual harass-
ment evidence, so that a hostile work environment harassment
claim may have been established."' 19
Support for the Tenth Circuit's use of aggregation stemmed
from two different sources. First, the court cited Meritor Savings
110. See supra Part III.
111. District courts in both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have employed ag-
gregation. See Anthony v. County of Sacramento, 898 F. Supp. 1435, 1446 (E.D.
Cal. 1995);Jones v. City of Overland Park, No. 92-2163-KHV, 1994 WL 583153 *2
(D. Kan. Aug. 15, 1994); Stingley v. Arizona, 796 F. Supp. 424, 428 (D. Ariz. 1992).
112. 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987). See supra text accompanying notes 96-
101 for the facts of Hicks I.
113. Hicks I, 833 F.2d at 1416.
114. See id. at 1408.
115. See id. at 1411.
116. See id. at 1413.
117. See id. at 1416.
118. Id. at 1415-16.
119. Id. at 1416-17. On remand, the plaintiff did not prevail. Hicks II, 928
F.2d at 973. "Hicks failed to persuade the district court that evidence of racial and
sexual harassment-taken together-created a work environment heavily polluted
with discrimination." Id. (internal citation omitted). The circuit court affirmed
the decision of the trial court. Id.
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Bank v. Vinson,120 in which the Supreme Court explicitly adopted
the "totality of circumstances" approach that the EEOC employs in
sexual harassment administrative proceedings.12' The EEOC's in-
terpretation of sexual harassment law recognizes that racial harass-
ment can contribute to a hostile work environment. The Tenth
Circuit in Hicks Ilikewise concluded that racial harassment may be
considered when determining severity. Second, in deciding Hicks I,
the Tenth Circuit sought to effectuate Title VII's goal of removing
employment discrimination based on any or all of its listed charac-
teristics. 122 The court was persuaded by the holding in Jefferies v.
Harris County Community Action Ass'nm'2 Jefferies held "that discrimi-
nation against Black females [could] exist even in [the] absence of
discrimination against [B]lack men or [W]hite women."12 4
The aggregation methodology is, however, subject to several
criticisms. First, as pointed out by Judge Seth, the lone dissenter in
Hicks I, cases employing aggregation evaluate "the impact of the
overall working conditions arising from whatever cause rather than
try[ing] the case as a sexual harassment case under Mefitor." 12
Judge Seth argues that aggregation, as it stands in the case, "is not a
combination of statutorily protected characteristics advanced as a
subclass as in Jefferies, nor as a 'plus' case."' 2 6
This criticism, though valid, merely points out that the majority
in Hicks I was being intellectually disingenuous. The majority re-
quired aggregation of the harassment, 127 but, in effect, fashioned a
general remedy for harassing conduct in the workplace and labeled
it a sexual harassment claim. The resulting claim, however, is the
functional equivalent of the interactive workplace harassment
claim, discussed below in Part WV.B. Assuming the validity of the
rationale underlying the creation of an interactive workplace har-
assment claim, the actions of the majority, though circuitous, are
acceptable.
Second, critics may argue that the aggregation methodology
unfairly affords a remedy in situations where other plaintiffs (e.g.,
those who did not experience sexual harassment fused with race,
120. 477 U.S. at 57.
121. Id. at 69. "In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual
harassment, the Commission will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of
the circumstances." 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1604.11(b) (1996).
122. See Hicks , 833 F.2d at 1416.
123. 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980).
124. Id at 1032. See infra Part IV.B. for further discussion of Jefftries.
125. Hicks , 833 F.2d at 1420 (Seth, J., dissenting).
126. Id
127. See id. at 1415-16.
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whether Black or not) would not recover. However, as the court in
Hicks Imentioned, Title VII has been interpreted to provide a rem-
edy for any combination of listed characteristics. 128 Therefore, the
results achieved by aggregation are not unfair because they com-
port with the mandate of Title VII.
A third possible criticism of the aggregation technique put
forth by the court in Hicks uis that it is an ambiguous standard. The
court gives no guidelines as to the requisite number or severity of
the racial comments which, when added to the sexually-focused be-
havior, will raise the severity of the sexual conduct to the level re-
quired to warrant a remedy. This problem, however, is not unique
to aggregation. The standard of evaluation used in other cases that
do not employ aggregation to examine whether a situation is suffi-
ciently hostile likewise suffer from ambiguity because no bright-line
rule exists for making this determination. In these cases, the matter
is left to the discretion of the trier of fact to be made on a case-by-
case basis. 129 Consequently, it is neither unusual nor unacceptable
that the Hicks I court did not explicitly delineate a clear standard.
Yet another shortcoming of aggregation is that while aggrega-
tion potentially provides protection for Black women plaintiffs, ag-
gregation does not allow for the recognition of the unique
harassment experiences of Black women. Because the aggregation
approach is applied within the context of the current sexual harass-
ment framework, Black women are still simply a variation on the
White norm.1 30 This mode of analysis marginalizes the fact that
race has played a role in a Black woman's sexual harassment experi-
ence. Racial hostility is only aggregated where a plaintiff can allege
some minimum level of sexually harassing conduct;5 1 thus, in the
absence of conduct occurring but-for her gender, a Black woman
may not recover. 132 If the goal of reforming sexual harassment law
is merely to provide a remedy to Black women where they otherwise
may not have one, however, this deficiency does not present an im-
portant weakness in the methodology.
Aggregating sexual and racial conduct to determine the sever-
ity level of the harassing behavior provides one viable option for
128. See supra text accompanying notes 122-24.
129. See 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1604.11(b).
130. See discussion supra Part II.
131. See Jones, 1994 WL 583153 at *5-6.
132. Of course, as stated previously, a Black female may claim racial harass-
ment. The point, however, is that she may not be able to recover under a theory of
racial harassment, either, because her gender undercuts the racial nature of the
harassment.
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accounting for the racialized sexual harassment of Black women.
Moreover, because aggregation works within the existing frame-
work for Title VII sexual harassment claims, it is also a natural and
logical option.
B. Formulation of a Workplace Harassment Claim
In an effort to acknowledge the role race may play in sexual
harassment claims, recognition of an "interactive workplace harass-
ment" claim in lieu of the traditional sexual harassment framework
may be appropriate. Courts have already fashioned an interactive
employment discrimination claim in the context of Title VII.133
The interactive workplace harassment claim would be another spe-
cies of that claim. Furthermore, some legal scholars have argued
that Black women should be protected as a discrete class.13 The
interactive workplace harassment claim would be an effective substi-
tute for the existing sexual harassment framework because it com-
prehensively redresses the harms suffered by a broad class of
persons who suffer harassment due to the combination of race and
gender.
Jeffefries v. Harris County Community Action Ass ljeM was the first
circuit court case in which a Title VII claim of discrimination based
on the interaction of race and gender was recognized. Plaintiff ar-
gued that if "a Title VII plaintiff alleges that her employer discrimi-
nated against [B]lack females, the only statistics relevant to that
claim of discrimination would be the number of [B]lack females
hired or promoted by the employer."13 6 The circuit court agreed,
holding that Black women were a discrete class entitled to protec-
tion.'3 7 Many cases since Jefferies have likewise recognized an inter-
133. SeeJefferies, 615 F.2d at 1025. See infra text accompanying notes 135-38
for an explanation of the interactive employment discrimination claim as identi-
fied in Jefferies.
134. See e.g., Scales-Trent, supra note 4.
135. 615 F.2d at 1025. InJefferies, the plaintiff alleged that her employer, Har-
ris County Community Action Association ("HCCAA"), discriminated against her
on the basis of race, or sex, or, in the alternative, race and sex, in failing to pro-
mote her and in terminating her employment. See id. at 1028. lJefferies' undis-
puted testimony established that every position for which she had applied had
been filled by males or non-[B]lack females." Id. at 1029. The District Court's
opinion, which held thatJefferies failed to prove either a claim of race discrimina-
tion or sex discrimination, was reversed on appeal. See id. at 1032-35. Additionally,
the appellate court determined that the district court failed to address Jefferies'
claim of discrimination on the basis of both race and gender. See id. at 1032.
136. Id. at 1032 (emphasis in original).
137. See id at 1034.
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active discrimination claim 138 which accepts the proposition that
Black women, as a group, face discrimination separate and apart
from men and White women, and therefore Black women merit
enhanced judicial protection.
Because both sexual harassment and racial harassment are
forms of discrimination prohibited by Title VII,'3 9 the holding in
Jefferies should be extended to recognize Black women as a discrete
class in Title VII sexual harassment cases. This Note argues that the
principles underlying the legal requirements for proving racial har-
assment 140 and sexual harassment 41 may be combined to create a
Title VII prima facie case based on an interactive workplace harass-
ment framework.
The proposed interactive workplace harassment framework
consists of the following elements: (1) plaintiff's status is protected
under Title VII; (2) plaintiff was subject to unwelcome conduct be-
cause of her status; and (3) the employer is responsible.
With respect to the first element, "' [s] tatus' is a term which
sociologically identifies one's position in society... [Thus, in the
case of Black women, they].... possess two statuses which derive
from attributes over which they have no control: membership in
the [B]lack race and membership in the female sex." 142 The com-
bination of these two statuses creates a new status, which should be
protected under Title VII. The second element, whether the con-
duct is sufficiently harmful to warrant a remedy, should be deter-
mined by the same barometer that currently measures hostile
environment sexual harassment cases, 145 except that all harassing
conduct, regardless of which protected status motivated it, should
be considered in determining whether the severity requirement is
met. Finally, the employer's responsibility for an employee's harass-
ing behavior should likewise be determined according to the rules
of other hostile environment sexual harassment cases.144
138. See, e.g., Lam v. University of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994) (plain-
tiff was an Asian female);Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770, 779-80 (D.D.C. 1986);
Chambers v. Omaha Girls' Club, 629 F. Supp. 925 (D. Neb. 1986); Graham v. Ben-
dix, 585 F. Supp. 1036, 1047 (D. Ind. 1984).
139. 42 U.S.G.§ 2000e-2 (1996).
140. See supra note 14 for the elements of a racial harassment claim.
141. See supra text accompanying note 80 for the elements of a sexual haraiss-
ment claim.
142. Scales-Trent, supra note 4, at 13 (citations omitted).
143. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
144. The applicable standard is outlined in 29 C.F.R. § § 1604.11(c)-
(d) (1996). Generally, an employer is liable for its acts and those of its agents re-
gardless of whether the employer authorized or prohibited the harassment and
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Once the plaintiff meets this three-part burden, the defendant
may dispute one of the prima facie elements or argue that the con-
duct was based on factors other than the interaction of race and
gender. Generally, however, once a plaintiff establishes the prima
facie case, the burden shifts and liability will follow unless the em-
ployer can argue that it is not legally responsible because it neither
knew nor should have known of the misconduct or because, once it
had learned of the misconduct, the employer acted immediately
and effectively to remedy the situation.
The propriety of protecting Black women as a discrete class
under Title VII was previewed in a pre-Jefferies case, Degraffenreid v.
General Motors Assembly Division)m4 In Degraffenreid the court found
that Black women were not a special class to be protected from dis-
criminaion. 146 The court based its conclusion on three points.
First, the court found no precedent for such a claim. 47 Second,
the court articulated the belief that the plaintiffs "should not be
allowed to combine statutory remedies to create a new 'super-rem-
edy' which would give them relief beyond what the drafters of the
relevant statutes intended."148 Third, the court believed that al-
lowing combination claims would open a Pandora's box of myriad
claims based on multiple statuses. 149
The concerns of the court in Degraffenreid were unsupported,
however. The Jefferies court provided ample rationale for the pro-
tection of Black women. First, precedent for the holding in Jef-
feries150 was derived from the Supreme Court decision in Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Co"p.15 1 which put forth the "sex-plus" theory of dis-
crimination. 152 In Jefferies, the Court relied upon the sex-plus the-
regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known of the harassment.
Id. at § 1604.11(c). An employer is liable for conduct between co-workers where
the employer knew or should have known of the harassment, unless the employer
took immediate and appropriate action to remedy the situation. See id. at
§ 1604.11 (d).
145. 413 F. Supp. 142, 143 (E.D. Mo. 1976). The plaintiffs claimed that the
"'last hired-first fired' lay off policies of the defendants discriminate[d] against
them as [B]Iack women" in violation of Title VII. Id.
146. See id. at 143.
147. See id.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 145. For this same reason, in Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. at 780,
the court limited the efferies holding to cases involving two characteristics pro-
tected under Title VIIU-such as race and gender.
150. 615 F.2d at 1025.
151. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
152. Id. In Phillips, the Supreme Court recognized "that disparate treatment
of a subclass of women could constitute a violation of Title VII." Id. at 544.
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ory, stating that unlawful discrimination occurs where "sex plus an
immutable characteristic or a constitutionally protected activity
such as marriage or child-rearing regulations... 'present obstacles
to employment of one sex that cannot be overcome."'153
Second, the Degrafftenreid court was wrong in claiming that the
formulation of a new claim created a "super-remedy" for Black wo-
men. Black women are seeking protection where Title VII "already
protects [B]lacks and women against discrimination under the pro-
hibition against discrimination based on race or sex, and where
such a reading [as that in Degraffenreid] would allow discrimination
to go unremedied." 154 Title VII protects people from employment
discrimination on the basis of gender or race. An employer should
not escape liability for discriminating against Black females by
showing that it neither discriminates against Blacks nor discrimi-
nates against females. 155 Congress' use of the disjunctive in Title VII
demonstrates its intent to prohibit discrimination based on any or
all of the characteristics listed in Title VII. 15 In the absence of a
clear indication that Congress deliberately sought not to protect
Black women, the law cannot be construed to leave them without a
remedy. 157 Thus, such protection is clearly within the ambit of the
statute.
Third, recognizing Black women's distinct claims would not
open a Pandora's box of endless claims because any claim would be
limited to combinations of those groups already protected under
Title VII. Nevertheless,
[c] ourts that are willing to allow other groups' race-sex claims,
based upon the same principles as Black women's race-sex
claims, may be uncomfortable recognizing that Title VII claims
can be based upon as many as three, four, or five of the pro-
tected categories-race, color, religion, sex, and national
origin .... 158
This fear should not block the path to justice. Courts are not
in the business of solving problems only when the solution is easy to
153. Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1033. Many commentaries have criticized Jefferies'
analogy to "sex-plus" methodology because sex-plus is ideologically and method-
ologically constraining for Black women. See Peggie R. Smith, Separate Identities:
Black Women, Work, and Title VII, 14 HARv. WOMEN'S LJ. 21, 40 (1991); Scarbor-
ough, supra note 9, at 1471.
154. Scales-Trent, supra note 4, at 38 n.139.
155. See Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1032.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. Scarborough, supra note 9, at 1476.
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determine. Courts routinely address difficult questions. Their task
is to sift through all the evidence presented on the various compo-
nents of the discrimination claim, and draw a reasoned conclusion.
Like aggregation, protecting Black women as a discrete class is
also a viable option for recognizing claims of interactive harass-
ment. Although it does not work within the existing framework
under which sexual harassment claims are analyzed, it is an enticing
option because it is a more narrow species of the alread)y-recog-
nized interactive discrimination claim outlined in Jeffreries.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
As they are neither White nor male, Black women stand at the
intersection of race and gender. Many times, their experiences of
racism and sexism are blended into an inseparable whole. Sexual
harassment is a prime example: on occasion, race and culture inter-
act with gender to form a type of sexual harassment that is infused
with race. Because Black women do not fit neatly into sexual har-
assment legal frameworks, they may be adversely affected when they
are victims of sexual harassment in the workplace. To remedy this
discrepancy, two options are possible. One method is to view evi-
dence of racial hostility conjunctively with sexual hostility, while a
second option is to protect Black women, through the formulation
of a workplace harassment claim, as a discrete class because of their
distinct status as Black women. Which methodology should ulti-
mately be adopted is unclear. What is clear is that some change in
the current construct of sexual harassment law must be made. The
current framework is too rigid and confining to encompass the
range of women's experiences. Practitioners must push the bound-
aries of the law to provide greater protection to a broader group of
injured people.
EPILOGUE
REVISITING LESLIE IN LIGHT OF OUR DISCUSSION
It has been a week or so since Leslie came to you for help. After doing
some preliminary factual investigation and legal research, you have chosen
to represent Leslie. Her case presents interesting issues. As you begin to think
about drafting a complaint, the question immediately arises: TWiat is the
theory of the case? How does Leslie's race factor into what intuitively seems
to be a sexual harassment claim?
You think to yourself that you have three possible claims: hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment, racial harassment, and workplace discrimina-
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tion. Thinking quickly through the framing of each claim and the
probability of success with each, here is what you come up with.
Prevailing on a traditional hostile environment sexual harassment
claim would be difficult for two reasons. First, with respect to the White co-
worker, it is unclear whether his conduct was motivated by Leslie's race or
Leslie's gender. Clearly, his conduct has sexual overtones, but a court may
determine that race was the overriding factor. Second, the actions of the
Black co-worker, because he is Black, may be deemed to have been motivated
solely by gender. The one incident, however, probably does not meet the sever-
ity requirement.
Maybe you could get the court to aggregate the racial elements with the
sexual conduct. That would probably help meet the severity level, but this
circuit has not endorsed aggregation. You may have to place your client in
the uncomfortable, but ground-breaking, position of serving as the test case.
A racial harassment claim might also fail because the gender-directed
conduct could undercut a claim that the harassing behavior was racially
focused. You are between a rock and a hard place: you may not prevail on
the hostile environment claim because gender may be seen as the motivating
factor and you may not prevail on the sexual harassment claim because of
the racial element. You could allege both sexual harassment and racial har-
assment. You hope that a court would not be so unthinking as to knock out
both claims. But you never know, stranger things have happened.
In the best of all worlds, you would be able to claim simply that Leslie
was subjected to workplace harassment. This would allow you to allege sim-
ply that she was harassed because she is a Black woman. Because it is a
more holistic approach, you would not have to ty to bisect Leslie's exper-
iences into some based on gender and some based on race. Such interactive
discrimination is already recognized in the general context of employment
discrimination. There is no reason why it should not apply here.
What to do? What to do?
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